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TAKING LEGITIMACY SERIOUSLY: A 
RETURN TO DEONTOLOGY 
Eric Heinze* 
Democracy is the ongoing product of public discussion.1 With 
what legitimacy, then, can a democracy limit its citizens’ 
participation in that discussion? The question has crystallised in 
recent years around problems of “extreme” expression,2 with a 
particular focus on so-called “hate speech.”3 
Extreme expression plays a paradoxical role in a democracy. 
On the one hand, it involves a small fraction of all messages. Even 
democracies passionately combatting it tend to bring few 
prosecutions and to impose mild penalties. Stronger crackdowns 
generally target high-profile provocateurs like Jean-Marie 
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 1. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 
v–ix (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) [hereinafter EXTREME SPEECH]; JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, MORALBEWUßTSEIN UND KOMMUNIKATVES HANDELN [MORAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION] (1983) (Ger.); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS [THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION] 
(1981) (Ger.); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995) [hereinafter 
POST (1995)]; Robert C. Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AMERICAN 
ACADEMY POL. & LEGAL THEORY 24 (2006) [hereinafter Post (2006)]; Robert C. Post, 
Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997) 
[hereinafter Post (1997)]; Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 
VA. L. REV. 477 (2011) [hereinafter Post (2011a)]; Robert C. Post, Partipatory Democracy 
as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617 (2011) [hereinafter Post (2011b)]. 
 2. See Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, General Introduction, in EXTREME SPEECH 4 
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009); cf. ERIC HEINZE, HATE SPEECH AND 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 18–26 (2016) (examining legal concepts of extreme “speech” 
and “expression”) [hereinafter HEINZE (2016)]. 
 3. See infra notes 12, 16 and 38. 
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LePen,4 Geert Wilders,5 or Dieudonné M’bala M’bala.6 The 
prosecuting states aim more for symbolic condemnation7 than for 
comprehensive enforcement, which tops few democracies’ lists of 
priorities. On the other hand, for many writers, including Jeremy 
Waldron, extreme expression exemplifies a type of 
communication that can legitimately be excluded from public 
discourse, irrespective of its ranking within any broader scheme 
of human problems. Under well-drafted bans, Waldron maintains, 
speakers enjoy full freedom to state the substance of their views, 
but can rightly be asked to exercise care in the form of words they 
choose.8 
As I shall argue in this article, that form-substance distinction 
is what derails Waldron’s approach. Defenders of speech bans 
cannot coherently divide acts of human expression into two 
parts—on the one hand, the substance of a message, conveying its 
viewpoint, and, on the other hand, that message’s particular form 
of words, which might somehow be regulated without affecting 
the viewpoint. Like other defenders of bans, Waldron fails to 
establish his essential thesis, namely, that bans on extreme 
expression can be reconciled with democratic legitimacy. In his 
present debate with James Weinstein, it is Weinstein who—
although I do note one caveat to Weinstein’s view, for which I 
shall propose an amendment—fundamentally succeeds in 
depicting speech bans as democratically illegitimate. Fully-
fledged democracies may take a host of measures to eliminate 
discrimination, but cannot legitimately penalise citizens who enter 
 
 4. See, e.g., Rachel Roberts, Jean-Marie Le Pen Charged over Alleged Antisemitic 
Remarks, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/jean-
marie-le-pen-charged-antisemitic-remarks-marine-le-pen-front-national-french-
presidential-a7576151.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Netherlands Trial: Geert Wilders Guilty of Incitement, BBC (Dec. 9 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38260377. 
 6. See, e.g., French Comedian Dieudonné Given Prison Sentence for Hate Speech, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/25/french-
comedian-dieudonne-prison-sentence-hate-speech. 
 7. See, e.g., Christoph Seils, Selbstläufer symbolischer Politik: Wie ein Verbot der 
NPD auf die politische Agenda kam. in VERBOT DER NPD ODER MIT RECHTSRADIKALEN 
LEBEN? 44–50 (Claus Leggewie & Horst Meier eds., 2002) (Ger.); Julie C. Suk, Denying 
Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-Speech Theory of State, in THE CONTENT AND 
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 144–63 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012). But see 
HEINZE, supra note 2, at 162–65. 
 8.  See Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James 
Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 697, 700–01, 713–14 (2017). 
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the public sphere to oppose pluralist values, however 
provocatively or crudely they may do so. 
1. THE DEMOCRATIC HURDLE 
Various elements can render speech “extreme.” The blandest 
idea—a nursery rhyme or a toothpaste advertisement—can be 
broadcast at “extremely” high volume. Conversely, one can 
communicate “extremely” dangerous information in a whisper. 
From the outset, we must apply an age-old distinction in free 
speech jurisprudence between the extremity of a message and 
extremity in the manner of its expression. Today’s fiercest debates 
about free speech emphasize the message. They focus not on 
extremities of “time, manner, or place,” such as loud volumes late 
at night in residential areas. Jurists and scholars widely agree with 
at least minimal regulations for those elements.9 
Nor do current controversies focus on objectionable content 
per se. Experts readily agree that content such as commercial 
fraud or courtroom perjury can be subjected to legitimate 
regulation. Rather, our intractable disputes concern the 
regulation of extreme messages on grounds of their viewpoint.10 
In this article I shall use the phrase “bans on extreme expression 
per se” to denote laws imposing penalties on expression because of 
the viewpoint of the message, that is, because of its philosophy or 
worldview, and not because of excesses in the time, manner, or 
place of its communication. 
Controversies about extreme expression have raged because 
they raise questions about how various principles ought to govern 
individual liberty. One, for example, is a consequentialist 
principle. History reveals atrocious political consequences fuelled 
by extreme speech acts.11 States, in the view of some observers, 
 
 9. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION 38–48 (2015); JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1447–74 (8th ed., 2009); EDWIN C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH 125–37, 162–63, 173–74 (1989). 
 10. Cf. HEINZE, supra note 2, at 19–22 (distinguishing between the concepts of 
“content” and “viewpoint”); James Weinstein, An Overview of American Free Speech 
Doctrine and Its Application in Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH, supra note 1, at 82–83, 
86–87. 
 11. See, e.g., JOSEPH BEMBA, JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE ET LIBERTÉ 
D’EXPRESSION: LES MÉDIAS FACE AUX CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX (2008) (Fr.); MARTIN 
IMBLEAU, LA NÉGATION DU GÉNOCIDE NAZI, LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION OU CRIME 
RACISTE?: LE NÉGATIONNISME DE LA SHOAH EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARÉ 
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must regulate such acts in order to safeguard not only vulnerable 
citizens,12 but the very survival of their democracies.13 The 
problem with consequentialist arguments is that causal links from 
extreme expression to mass atrocities have been established only 
in societies that are either undemocratic or very weakly 
democratic. Throughout decades of publications, any statistically 
demonstrable pattern of such causal links within fully-fledged 
democracies,14 despite such expression being constantly present, 
have repeatedly been asserted yet have in no empirically reliable 
way been documented.15 
Another principle is dignitarian: in the interest of ensuring 
basic civic equality for all citizens, government may legitimately 
penalise heinous expression found to be targeting the human 
dignity of others, particularly of members of socially vulnerable 
groups. On that view, tracing material causation from hateful 
expression to empirically demonstrable harms altogether 
misconstrues the types of harms such expression causes: the 
hateful expression is itself the harm.16 
There are other such principles, reflecting liberal, republican, 
critical, and radical approaches.17 One in particular becomes 
decisive in the present debate between Weinstein and Waldron, 
namely, a democratic one.18 For Weinstein, along with writers like 
Ronald Dworkin and Robert Post, free speech ensures such an 
exceptionally high political value that even extreme expression 
 
(2003) (Fr.); ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES 
THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002). 
 12. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? 
(1999); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT 
WOUND (2004); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993). 
 13. See, e.g., WEHRHAFTE DEMOKRATIE: BEITRÄGE ÜBER DIE REGELUNGEN ZUM 
SCHUTZE DER FREIHEITLICHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN GRUNDORDNUNG (Markus Thiel 
ed., 2003) (Ger.). 
 14. See HEINZE, supra note 2, at 69–78 (examining conditions under which 
democracies can be fully held to their legitimating criteria). 
 15. See id. at 125–29. 
 16. See, e.g., STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 164–83 
(2008); Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech, Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, in 
EXTREME SPEECH, supra note 2, at 158–81; JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE 
SPEECH (2012); Cf. infra note 38. 
 17. See HEINZE, supra note 2, at 11–15. 
 18. See id. at 55–56, 88–94 (distinguishing between liberal and democratic theories). 
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must be admitted19 into public discourse.20 Waldron agrees that 
democratic legislation, administration, and adjudication draw 
their legitimacy from the assumption of an open, public sphere in 
which all viewpoints may be aired. They disagree, however, about 
whether bans on extreme expression exclude speakers from that 
sphere in any way that diminishes a state’s claim to democratic 
legitimacy. 
Suppose certain citizens are to be excluded from public 
discourse pro tanto—that is, to the extent of their proscribed 
expression. The question for Weinstein and Waldron becomes: 
can the legal system legitimately be enforced against those 
citizens, insofar as they end up excluded from democratically 
essential processes of opinion formation? That question is crucial 
for all writers who defend bans on extreme expression per se on 
dignitarian grounds. Few of us, after all, can have any objection to 
the state using democratic processes to promote the basic value of 
human dignity through, for example, prohibitions on extrajudicial 
killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, rigged trials, or forms of 
racial or other discrimination. The problem arises when that value 
is deployed in apparent conflict with certain necessary 
foundations of a democracy. Dignitarians cannot legitimately 
proceed to speech bans except via democracy, whose demands of 
admitting all viewpoints must first be answered. Waldron’s 
answer is that such bans need not exclude anyone from full 
democratic participation21: “it is misleading to say that hate 
speech restrictions prohibit the expression of certain views per 
se.”22 In the remainder of the present essay I shall examine why 
that view fails. 
 
 19. Dworkin, supra note 1; Ronald Dworkin, Reply to Jeremy Waldron, in THE 
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES 
341–44 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012); POST (1995), supra note 1; Post (1997), 
supra note 1; Post (2006), supra note 1; Post (2011a), supra note 1; Post (2011b), supra note 
1; James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Radical Attack on Free Speech 
Doctrine (1999); James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Viewpoint Neutrality, and the American 
Concept of Democracy, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 146, 161-66 (Thomas R. Hensley ed., 2001); James Weinstein, 
Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 491 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American 
Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633 (2011). 
 20. See HEINZE, supra note 2, at 26–30 (distinguishing public discourse from other 
spheres of expression). 
 21.  See Waldron, supra note 8, at 703–04, 713–14. 
 22.  Id. at 702. 
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2. JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY 
For Waldron, “the problem of legitimacy is to find a basis on 
which a law may permissibly be enforced even against people who 
disagree with its content.”23 He refers to that problem as “a 
function of its neglect in political theory.”24 Such a claim is 
puzzling, given that the pioneers of modern political theory seem 
concerned with little else. 
Whilst deriving from legitimatus, meaning “to make lawful,” 
it comes into usage only around the late 16th century. Writing in 
a precariously divided Europe, the aim of theorists like Hobbes, 
Montesquieu, or Rousseau is to develop legal frameworks that 
command obedience to substantive norms, notwithstanding 
disputes about those norms’ substantive justice. To be sure, we 
often use the term “legitimacy” in looser, colloquial senses, to 
mean “rightness,” “reasonableness,” “fairness,” or indeed 
“justice.” Weinstein and Waldron, however, use it to denote some 
ethical reason for citizens to submit to a democratic legal system (“I 
obey as a matter of principle, because obeying the law of my 
democracy is the right thing to do”)—that is, some reason to obey 
law beyond its sheer coercive power (“I obey solely as a matter of 
self-interest, to avoid fines, arrests, prison sentences, or a bad 
reputation”). 
Early modern theory is dominated by the contractarian 
model, a consensualist approach which revives in the 20th century 
under the liberal-democratic schema of John Rawls. A legal 
system, on the contractarian view, commands legitimacy when 
plausible grounds can be adduced to suggest that we implicitly 
consent in practice, or that we would explicitly consent in 
principle, to submit to that system. For example, we rarely give 
express consent to laws punishing homicides or larcenies; 
however, on a contractarian theory, our consent can reasonably 
be inferred inasmuch as (a) we ourselves desire those laws’ 
protection; and (b) even if we do not desire such protection, or do 
not desire it in the particular form it takes within our legal system, 
democracy presupposes our freedom to voice any dissent from the 
prevailing law or to propose alternatives. 
Plato had long ago penned the classic exposition of “speak or 
obey”—we are bound to obey law insofar as we had an 
 
 23.  Id. at 707 (emphasis added). 
 24.  Id. at 698. 
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opportunity to speak out in order to change it—in his dialogue 
Crito. Yet that dialogue is, in two senses, an oddity. First, in 
ancient Greek thought, Crito is an uncharacteristic example of 
legitimacy distinguished from substantive justice, a step that 
neither Plato nor Aristotle otherwise take in their political 
writings. Second, contrary to common readings of the dialogue 
enjoining absolute obedience to law, Crito by no means claims 
universality across all political systems. Its “speak or obey” 
mantra25 makes sense only for a regime, like that of ancient 
Athens, in which a prerogative of parrhēsia, of frank, unhindered, 
even dissident speech, enjoys quasi-absolute legal protection (at 
least for all fully-fledged male citizens), indeed as constitutive of 
the legal order.26 
Plato’s other major political writings, such as the Republic, 
Statesman, and Laws, remove that high status of free speech. 
Adopting a model polis geographically and demographically 
smaller and more homogeneous than the modern state, those 
other dialogues envisage a more strongly shared recognition of 
substantive justice among the citizens,27 thereby superseding any 
distinct question as to the legitimacy of procedures irrespective of 
substantive results. Aristotle, too, envisages a sufficient consensus 
on substantive justice to be in principle achievable,28 a consensus 
he deems adaptable to changing material or social 
circumstances.29 By contrast, with the rise of the early nation-
state, spanning far larger and more diverse populations and land 
masses, the shift in focus from substantive justice to procedural 
legitimacy becomes decisive, starting in particular with Hobbes. 
Hegel launches over a century of theorists rejecting 
contractarianism, from Marx to Heidegger, and others of all and 
sundry outlooks, all stridently rejecting the contractualist 
assumption of divorcing legal legitimacy from substantive 
 
 25. Crito 50a-e, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 37, 44-45 (John M. Cooper ed., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1997) [hereinafter PLATO]. 
 26. Cf. Eric Heinze, The Constitution of the Constitution: Democratic Legitimacy and 
Public Discourse, in RANCIÈRE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LAW (Julen Extabe & Mónica 
López Lerma eds., forthcoming 2017). 
 27. See, e.g., Republic 5.462a, in PLATO, supra note 25, at 971, 1089; Laws 1.628a, in 
PLATO, supra note 25, at 1318, 1322. 
 28. Aristotle, Politics 3.11.1281a42-81b6, 82a16-18, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1986, 2033 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (4th century B.C.E.) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE]. 
 29. 2.8.1268b33-69a13, in 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 28, at 1986, 2013–14. 
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justice—thereby, in an important sense, returning to the postures 
of Plato and Aristotle.30 But we can leave those objections aside. 
Despite their disagreement, Waldron and Weinstein tacitly agree 
on a contractualist principle of legitimacy, disagreeing solely on 
the question of where that principle “leads.”31 For Weinstein—
although this is not exactly his phrasing—a democracy that 
excludes citizens from democratic opinion formation pro tanto 
dissolves its social contract with them, relieving them of their duty 
to obey law. For Waldron, no such breach occurs: insofar as 
citizens remain free to express any viewpoint in substance, they 
remain fully subject law; in that respect, any such social contract 
remains in force. 
Waldron’s suggestion of neglect of the problem of legitimacy 
clearly does not apply, then, to Western political theory, which has 
long placed legitimacy—the principle of law “enforced even 
against people who disagree with its content”—at centre stage. 
Such theoretical neglect does, by contrast, characterize certain 
types of legal theory, notably of the old “how should judges decide 
cases” variety. We can certainly identify familiar strands of 
jurisprudence undertaken both by judges and by scholars “writing 
as” judges, who aim to interpret norms that they identify as 
already-established in law. That task of expounding the law’s 
already-adopted norms either (a) assumes those norms’ 
legitimacy within the legal system by definition, or (b) assumes 
legitimacy to be a false or irrelevant question. Both (a) and (b) 
are indeed attitudes that “neglect” questions of legal legitimacy. 
Genuine questions of legitimacy arise only when the rightness of 
already-admitted norms, or of otherwise prevailing 
interpretations of them, comes into question. 
What, then, is legitimacy? Waldron’s reference to law 
permissibly enforced against people who disagree with its content 
is adequate enough, subject to two reservations. First, I shall 
substitute his adverb “permissibly” with “rightly.” After all, a 
magistrate could issue a warrant for a police squad to arrest a 
given citizen, knowing full well that the citizen has done nothing 
unlawful. When the police make the arrest, they do it 
“permissibly,” because a warrant is by definition a permission. 
They do not, however, make the arrest rightly, even if 
 
 30. See, e.g., ERIC HEINZE, THE CONCEPT OF INJUSTICE 42-49 (2013). 
 31.  Waldron, supra note 8, at 700. 
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responsibility for the wrongful arrest lies entirely with the 
magistrate. Second, I shall substitute Waldron’s noun “content” 
with the word “justice.” After all, a dispute about a law’s 
“content” can be entirely semantic. Individuals may agree on a 
law’s aim, disputing only whether the “content” of a draft text, in 
the sense of its wording, is most conducive to achieving that aim 
as matter of sheer clarity, efficiency, strategy, or logistics. Those 
technical disputes are irrelevant to the problem of legitimacy. I 
shall postulate, then, that to be legitimate, a law must be rightly 
enforceable even against citizens who dispute its justice. 
Two central questions of legitimacy arise in the present 
debate. The first is the question about the legitimacy of speech 
bans as such: can a democracy legitimately exclude extreme 
expression per se from public discourse? The second is the 
question about whether a democracy can rightly enforce other 
laws against persons who have been pro tanto excluded from 
democratic public discourse. The importance of the debate 
between Weinstein and Waldron is that it illustrates how that 
second question becomes decisive for resolving the first: if a 
democracy may not rightly enforce other laws against citizens 
excluded pro tanto from public discourse, then bans on extreme 
expression perforce become illegitimate. That is the question to 
which we now turn in Section 3, as it will depend on whether bans 
on extreme expression per se end up necessarily excluding 
viewpoints from public discourse. 
3. FORM AND SUBSTANCE 
For Waldron, citizens remain free to articulate the substance 
of any viewpoint, because an appropriately worded ban on 
extreme expression regulates only the form of that viewpoint’s 
expression.32 In essence, say what you like, just tone down the 
language. Theorists of language, however, abandoned that form-
substance distinction ages ago. Its last exponents were the 20th 
century logical positivists, such as Rudolph Carnap33 and Alfred 
 
 32.  See Waldron, supra note 8, at 700–01, 713–14. 
 33. RUDOLF CARNAP, DER LOGISCHE AUFBAU DER WELT [THE LOGICAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD] 1928 (Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag 1999). 
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Ayer.34 Logical positivism quickly became discredited, however, 
by the “linguistic turn” in philosophy and social sciences.35 
Consider the sentence “Eve desires the apple.” We can 
imagine any number of similar utterances: “Eve craves the apple,” 
“The apple is tempting Eve,” “The apple sings out to Eve,” and 
so forth. On the logical-positivist view, those sentences share a 
core or fixed meaning, something like: “Eve wants the apple.” 
Accordingly, if the state of Puritania bans the use of the verbs 
“desire,” “crave,” “tempt,” and “sing,” only the form of 
expression is lost, not the substance. The substance can be 
conveyed through the verb “want.” After all, who ever heard of 
singing apples? 
If I complain that “want,” “desire,” and “crave” are 
separated by nuance, that their differences are not objectively 
ascertained but rather a matter of “hunch” or “intuition,” the 
logical positivists insist that such differences can only be either 
demonstrable or meaningless.36 They might add that what appear 
to be subjective differences are in fact matters of degree: the verb 
“desires” just means, for example, that Eve “really wants” the 
apple, and “craves” just means, to quote the Spice Girls, that Eve 
“really, really wants” it. 
Given the scope of the present essay, I shall forego any 
attempt to summarise over a century of post-Wittgensteinian 
linguistic philosophy, post-Heideggerian phenomenology, post-
Saussaurian semiotics, post-Freudian social theory, and post-
romantic aesthetic theory. I’ll simply assume that the differences 
between “want,” “desire,” and “crave,” even when they at times 
correlate to differences of degree, do not wholly reduce to 
material or measurable quanta. Such words are never perfectly 
coextensive nor perfectly interchangeable. Barring ironic 
contexts, “Eve craves the apple” surely does mean that she wants 
it, and indeed that she desires it, but need not exhaustively and 
exclusively mean either. 
Puritania, then, unquestionably bans certain types of 
expression on viewpoint-selective grounds. If I may lawfully say 
 
 34. ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (New York, Dover Pub. 
1952) (1936). 
 35. See, e.g., THE LINGUISTIC TURN: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Richard 
M. Rorty ed., Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press 1967). 
 36. AYER, supra note 34. 
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“Eve wants the apple” but not “Eve craves the apple,” it is 
because “craves” sparks associations—ideas—that Puritania aims 
to repress, irrespective of the intelligence of the ban or of the links 
it presupposes between means and ends. Even the broadest hate 
speech ban in any fully-fledged democracy today does not, of 
course, sweep as broadly as Puritania’s ban. Yet however 
prudently a ban on extreme expression per se may be tailored and 
implemented, it can never allow speakers to say “the same thing” 
but just with different words. 
Waldron defends bans on “stirring up of hatred in a 
community against a section of or a group within that 
community.”37 Before we proceed, and as a secondary though not 
unimportant matter, it may help to observe that Waldron 
apparently means not “community,” but rather “state,” in both 
instances in that sentence. The word “community” entails two 
meanings, either of which would serve more to dilute Waldron’s 
thesis than to strengthen it. First, the term “community” is 
commonly used today to denote a sub-group within the modern 
state. Yet Waldron surely does not envisage laws drafted solely 
for the state to govern such groups internally. He presumably 
envisages the opposite: bans applicable to all citizens throughout 
the entirety of a given jurisdiction. Second, if Waldron is using 
“community” here in a universalist vein, to suggest the validity of 
his position even outside modern statist contexts—perhaps to 
include the societies of ancient Babylonians, or medieval 
Samurais, or pre-Columbian Aztecs—then he needs a theory of 
legal legitimacy applicable not only to modern democracies but to 
those societies as well. Given our present difficulties in agreeing 
even on modern, democratic legitimacy, it is hard to see how such 
an ambition can streamline his task. I shall therefore proceed on 
the assumption that Waldron’s aim is to defend bans against 
stirring up of hatred within a modern state against a section of or 
a group within that state. 
Now let’s return to our main problem: any view that speech 
bans admit tidier versions of “the same” message, but which have 
no such “stirring up” intent or effect, suggests that we are dealing 
not with the same message, but with a different one, even if the 
two respective messages do both aim to promote the same broad 
(racist, homophobic, etc.) attitude. A given essage M1 and a given 
 
 37.  Waldron, supra note 8, at 701; cf. id. at 700–04. 
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message M2 may both be racist, and may both in that sense express 
some, perhaps similar racist viewpoint. Similarly, racist R1 and 
racist R2 may both be racists, and may both in that sense express 
some, perhaps similar racist viewpoint. Neither logically nor 
linguistically, however, does it follow either that M1 and M2, or 
that R1 and R2 express the same viewpoint. 
Those who already feel put off by what they see as civil-
libertarians’ perversely zealous defences of racist bullies and 
homophobic thugs may admittedly feel they can take little 
succour in my argument so far. For them, it’s bad enough that 
opponents of hate speech bans have defended free speech for such 
low-lifes. Now, not even satisfied with that, by exploding form-
substance distinctions, I’m weirdly granting their Neanderthal 
outbursts (no offense to Neanderthals) a kind of expressive 
uniqueness. Now it seems that “faggot” and “filthy Jew” must be 
allowed to retain their special little bounce, their imaginative flair, 
which the more humdrum “homosexual” and “Jew” may not 
muster. 
And yes, that’s exactly what I’m saying, for the simple reason 
that the contrary view lacks any plausible theory of language. I 
wholly acknowledge that, as a purely practical matter, nominal 
replacements of vicious for anodyne turns of phrase can indeed 
be made. Such sterilising substitutions are certainly feasible as a 
matter of makeshift routine. What remains wholly false is any 
suggestion that the state thereby succeeds in regulating only a 
message’s form and not its substance or viewpoint. To suggest the 
contrary is like saying: “Don’t bother reading Finnegan’s Wake. 
I’ll explain its substance to you.” Of course that comparison 
exaggerates the problem. Joyce’s narrative patently amounts to 
something denser than the mindless word “faggot.” But it is an 
exaggeration only in degree, not in character. 
One objection to my view might be that some hateful 
utterances are fundamentally “performative.” They operate not 
simply to express an idea, but above all to effectuate the real-
world construction of others as detestable. That view has won 
wide acceptance,38 but it reads too literally the theory of linguistic 
 
 38. See, e.g., Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
293, 305–30 (1993); Rae Langton, Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and 
Pornography, in SPEECH & HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 72 (Ishani 
Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 2012); Ishani Maitra, 
Subordinating Speech, in SPEECH & HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 94; 
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performatives. To observe the “illocutionary” or 
“perlocutionary” effects of certain utterances is one thing. To 
suggest that, being performative, such effects thereby remove 
from those utterances any expression of a viewpoint is altogether 
another. If they did, how would we even know the utterances to 
be hateful? None of the writers examining the linguistic 
performativity of hate speech have ventured quite that far.39 
4. ILLEGITIMACY WITHOUT DISOBEDIENCE 
Waldron’s form-substance distinction serves a broader 
strategy. He aims to establish that civil libertarians overstate the 
extent to which bans on extreme speech per se end up excluding 
citizens from public discourse. Waldron accuses them of making 
claims that are “as loose as they think they can get away with.”40 
He charges them with two types of “hyperbole.”41 First, Dworkin 
claims far too broadly that speakers as individuals end up 
altogether excluded from public discourse when they are 
penalised for their views. Second, Weinstein, albeit “more 
modest,”42 still claims rather too broadly that not speakers as such 
but still their particular viewpoints end up illegitimately excluded. 
Yet Waldron cannot sustain even that latter gripe, as it relies 
on the form-substance distinction. Consider an analogy. When 
U.S. public interest lawyers litigate against practices of racial 
gerrymandering, they commonly complain that black people end 
up “disenfranchised.” That is a broad term, encompassing not 
only a range of possible material effects but also a—perfectly 
reasonable—rhetorical plea. Those lawyers do not claim that their 
clients have literally lost all rights of citizenship. Nor, then do they 
draw any conclusion that, until such time as the electoral 
boundaries be re-drawn, their clients must be deemed exempt 
from all duties of citizenship as well, gaining thereby the license 
to act with total lawlessness. Read in the context of his lifetime’s 
output, none of which advocates radical disobedience to law, 
 
Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, Introduction and Overview, in SPEECH & HARM: 
CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 1. Cf. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A 
POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997). 
 39. For a further critique of performativity theories see HEINZE (2016), supra note 2, 
at 137–42. 
 40.  Waldron, supra note 8, at 700.  
 41.  Id. at 701, 711.  
 42.  Id. at 705. 
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Dworkin’s “hyperbole” is arguably little different—or at any rate 
can plausibly be read in such terms. 
Strictly speaking, however, Waldron does persuasively reject 
any right of disobedience that might be claimed by a citizen whose 
views are excluded under a ban on extreme speech per se. 
Weinstein, on Waldron’s view, “wants to reach a point at which 
we can say that [some person] P has a right to disobey” a law 
contrary to P’s banned viewpoint “or a right that it not be 
enforced against him.”43 This would indeed be my only serious 
reservation about Dworkin’s or Weinstein’s stances. In an effort 
to explain the democratic illegitimacy of viewpoint-selective 
penalties, Weinstein risks derailing his thesis by re-igniting well-
worn disputes about justified disobedience to law. Dworkin or 
Weinstein certainly would be wrong to conclude that any such 
remedy follows from the illegitimacy of bans. Recall that theories 
of civil disobedience, as opposed to theories of anarchic 
opposition to all law, aim mostly to identify circumstances that 
render conduct ethically right despite entailing legal violations. 
Even the most indulgent theories generally prescribe that the 
dissenter must still face the legal consequences.44 
One might try to retain a narrower immunity to law by 
limiting justified disobedience to laws “directly” relating to the 
proscribed speech, such as laws imposing upon employers various 
non-discrimination norms contrary to the viewpoints of excluded 
hate speakers.45 Ultimately, however, any such narrowing 
becomes too arbitrary. For example, a hate speaker expounding a 
comprehensively conspiratorial worldview (e.g., “Jews run the 
world”) can link that outlook to any legal norm or practice, right 
down to a speed limit or a tax on cigarettes. Once a citizen is 
excluded pro tanto from public discourse, there is no area of law 
to which that exclusion becomes irrelevant in principle. Waldron 
wins, then, in rejecting any justified disobedience on the part of 
pro tanto excluded citizens. But that victory is secondary, not 
decisive. Dworkin and Weinstein remain entirely correct on the 
main point, that is, in deeming democratically illegitimate any ban 
on extreme expression per se. The only remedy either of them 
 
 43. Id. at 709. 
 44. See, e.g., M. B. E. Smith, The Duty to Obey the Law, in A COMPANION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 457, 465-74 (Dennis Patterson ed., Blackwell 
Pub. 1996). 
 45.  Waldron, supra note 8, at 706.  
5 - HEINZE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17 9:55 AM 
2017] TAKING LEGITIMACY SERIOUSLY 645 
 
needs to propose is that, to the extent of such bans’ illegitimacy, 
they ought to be repealed. 
The citizen’s prerogative of expression within public 
discourse remains necessary to democracy, not as a matter of 
sheer expedience on a consequentialist criterion, but as a matter 
of principle—on a deontological criterion. To call an abridgment 
“slight” or de minimis is to misconstrue the character of a 
deontological argument. To draw a related analogy, in most 
democracies today the empirically measurable effect of one 
fraudulent ballot paper on an electoral outcome will usually be 
nil. On any consequentialist measure, it would have no impact and 
would be of no material importance, particularly in comparison to 
the many pressing problems states must every day confront. 
But that purely consequentialist criterion diminishes the 
inherent illegitimacy of the falsified ballot paper to near-triviality. 
A deontological criterion yields precisely the opposite 
normativity. The illegitimacy of one single act of falsification is 
categorical. It is not materially negated even by purely negligible 
real-world effects. If such conduct is indeed rare overall, one 
might fairly be accused of exaggerating its significance as a 
practical matter, because the society may face more immanently 
threatening problems. So, yes, in a context of such rare voter 
fraud, I would surely overlook it and would focus instead on 
environmental protection or tax equity. But the absolute 
illegitimacy of even a single ballot falsification remains 
undiminished by the mere observation that the actual occurrence 
of such conduct is rare or of scant impact. Infrequency renders 
such wrongdoing less threatening in practice, not less infirm in 
principle. (We could draw many such analogies. If only one adult 
on the entire planet abused a child, then the evil of child abuse 
certainly would not create a general social problem, but that 
single adult’s conduct would remain categorically heinous, wholly 
irrespective of the absence of such conduct by other adults.) You 
are certainly free to accuse me of hyperbole for insisting on the 
absolute illegitimacy of one fraudulent ballot paper, given such 
calamities as rampant war crimes or global warming. But all you 
are then making is a straightforward consequentialist observation 
about practical effects, and not a normative argument about 
legitimacy. 
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5. CRITERIA OF LEGITIMACY 
A problem with Waldron’s claims about legitimacy in his 
writing prior to the present debate is that he had never in the past 
explained what he thinks the right concept of legitimacy to be, 
instead attempting only to explain why Dworkin’s and 
Weinstein’s are wrong. Waldron certainly proffers various 
arguments of general social policy to support bans on extreme 
speech, all of which only beg the question of those bans’ legal 
legitimacy. That is why he and other defenders of bans need to 
win the present debate. If they lose, then all their remaining 
arguments, explaining that some extreme expression is bad,46 fail 
to establish that a democracy can legitimately ban it. Having made 
the two adjustments proposed in Section 2, we did glean from 
Waldron’s present article that to be legitimate, a law must be 
rightly enforceable even against citizens who dispute its justice. But 
that criterion is purely formal. It merely begs the question as to 
the kind of law that counts as “rightly enforceable.” 
It might help if, in addition to challenging Dworkin’s or 
Weinstein’s view in a solely offensive posture, he could propose 
precise criteria of his own. By an “offensive posture,” I mean that 
Waldron aims only to explain why hate speech bans aren’t 
illegitimate.47 He argues, for example, “what I have said doesn’t 
deny that hate speech laws may have an impact on legitimacy; 
what I am denying is that they have an impact on the state’s right 
to enforce particular laws against individuals.”48 That view 
presents a few puzzles, some easier to resolve than others. 
Let’s start with a preliminary obstacle, simply because of the 
conceptual precision our topic demands. To be sure, such a 
“right” is often ascribed colloquially to states, particularly in 
broadly ethical as opposed to strictly legal contexts. Yet strictly 
speaking—say, in a Hohfeldian sense—what Waldron surely 
means in characterising a state’s scope of action in this area is not 
 
 46. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 4, 30, 31, 33, 37, 39, 
45, 59, 65–69, 72, 96–97, 116–17 (2012) [hereinafter WALDRON (2012)]; Jeremy Waldron, 
Hate Speech and Political Legitimacy, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 
329, 331. Cf. Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and the Normative Foundations of Regulation, 9 
INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 590, 614 (2013) [hereinafter Heinze (2013)]. See also works cited in 
note 12, supra. 
 47. Waldron might be said to touch on legitimacy in his recourse to Rawls’s construct 
of the well-ordered society, but does not do so in any obvious way. See critically Heinze 
(2013), supra note 46, at 606–14. 
 48.  Waldron, supra note 8, at 711 (emphasis added). 
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its right to avail itself of existing law (which would merely beg the 
question at issue, namely, as to what that existing law may 
legitimately be), but rather its legitimate power both to make and 
to enforce “particular laws against individuals.”49 When we 
enquire into the extent of free speech, our enquiry is ordinarily 
into the extent of the individual’s right to enjoy that freedom, as 
against a government’s legitimate power to limit it. 
What counts, then, as a legitimate power? As I have thus far 
argued, the illegitimacy of a ban on extreme expression per se 
does not invalidate a state’s legitimate power to enforce other 
laws, such as non-discrimination laws, against persons who had 
been barred pro tanto from publicly speaking about those laws. 
What Waldron offers here, however, is a non-denial that bans may 
impact legitimacy. Is that a yes or a no? Given his repeated 
defence of bans, what is he claiming here? He cannot be referring 
to poorly drafted bans, since it is trivially obvious that a poorly 
drafted limit on essential democratic freedoms by definition 
impacts on legitimacy. What he apparently means is that even 
soundly drafted bans “may have an impact on legitimacy.” 
But how? Waldron commonly introduces his position on free 
speech not as a “wish to persuade” his audiences of hate speech 
bans’ “wisdom and legitimacy,” but only as a hope that his readers 
should better “understand” the bans’ rationales.50 But those 
disclaimers are misleading. I shall leave aside the question of 
whether Waldron’s many substantive claims can only seriously be 
construed as deeming bans to be necessary to achieve substantive 
justice. What lies beyond dispute is that, in his several writings, 
Waldron zealously insists that bans are permissible under criteria 
of democratic legitimacy.51 Yet here he claims that well-drafted 
bans “may” nevertheless be illegitimate. Bans can, then, be 
substantively just yet democratically flawed—so to speak, 
illegitimately good. But that approach turns legitimacy on its head. 
Waldron’s task, on his own stated criterion, is to identify 
legitimate norms regardless of their substantive justice, and not 
substantive justice regardless of its legitimacy. 
 
 49.  Id. at 711. 
 50. See, e.g., WALDRON (2012), supra note 46, at 10; cf. id. at 11–12; Jeremy Waldron 
& James Weinstein, The Legal Response to Hate Speech: Should the U.S. be more like 
Europe? 48:04 – 48:59 (Oct 26, 2012), http://online.law.asu.edu/Events/2012/HateSpeach 
(Retrieved Sep. 1, 2013). 
 51. See HEINZE (2016), supra note 3, at 25 n.79. 
5 - HEINZE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17 9:55 AM 
648 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:631 
 
In his previous writing Waldron observes— without express 
disapproval or proposing any alternative—that, “[i]n social 
science, legitimacy often means little more than popular 
support.”52 In a nutshell, if Americans don’t want bans, that’s 
legitimate for them; but if Europeans do want bans, that’s just as 
legitimate. Bans or no bans are equally legitimate— a view 
consonant with his questionable “I’m not taking a stand either 
way” protestations. That straightforwardly sociological or 
majoritarian criterion—legitimacy means whatever enough 
people want it to mean—would have spared everyone from 
Socrates to Kant much toil, as it equally turns legitimacy on its 
head. To collapse legitimacy into the sheer “is” of the head count 
is to empty it of any distinct meaning. Either legitimacy is an 
“ought” concept or it has no particular meaning at all. Waldron’s 
job is not to collapse legitimacy into popular support, but, to the 
contrary, to ask whether or under what circumstances popular 
support, or any other criterion, supplies legitimacy. 
In a break from those previous stances, however, Waldron 
does in the present exchange acknowledge a more distinctly 
normative criterion of legitiamcy. He claims to discover it in the 
views of “moral philosophers,” for whom “the best argument for 
the legitimacy of our laws (or of any particular law L) is a showing 
that the laws are morally justified or that L in particular is morally 
justified.”53 We have to take that thesis at face value because 
Waldron doesn’t tell us who those moral philosophers are or how 
they defend that position against what any number of their fellow 
philosophers would have to recognise as its patent vacuousness. 
After all, since when is “morally justified” facially more 
perspicuous than “legitimate”? Theories of morals have been 
written for centuries. Which one are we assuming? Does this 
formula merely revert back to Waldron’s earlier sociological or 
majoritarian criteria? 
On face value it is far from clear, moreover, that such a test 
is a distinct criterion of legitimacy at all, as opposed to a criterion 
that merely confuses legitimacy with its aforementioned 
colloquial meanings,54 indifferently equating it with policy or 
justice or goodness or morals or ethics writ large. Nowhere, for 
 
 52. WALDRON (2012), supra note 46, at 184. Cf. HEINZE (2016), supra note 2, at 44. 
 53. Waldron, supra note 8, at 707.  
 54. See above Section 2. 
5 - HEINZE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17 9:55 AM 
2017] TAKING LEGITIMACY SERIOUSLY 649 
 
example, does Waldron distinguish legitimacy in that formula 
from its more particular meaning within the contractarian 
tradition, which at least prima facie it rather blatantly contradicts. 
Unfortunately, then, Waldron does propose here a notion of 
legitimacy, but it in no way progresses beyond his earlier 
sociological or majoritarian criterion—which is not a normative 
criterion at all, but merely a social barometer. 
6. DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 
In a curious coda, Waldron concludes his essay on a 
completely novel point. He had, again, regularly invoked the 
form-content distinction, which was only ever relevant to try 
(unsuccessfully, as I have claimed) to argue that the state is not 
punishing the expression of particular viewpoints. Now, as if 
making an obvious afterthought, he abruptly suggests that it 
doesn’t matter even if bans do target certain viewpoints. Now 
suddenly viewpoints altogether ought to be censored insofar as “a 
society needs social peace and it is entitled to the assistance of 
citizens in maintaining that peace.”55 
No democrat even fleetingly versed in the history of free 
speech can mean such a claim with anything like the baldness with 
which Waldron states it. Our long chronicle of censorship, dating 
back centuries and indeed millennia, is nothing but a history of 
claims—often made in good faith—about “social peace”: from 
imprisoning heretics, to censoring liberals, to banning 
communists, to hunting down jihadists. It’s largely the origin of 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence in the U.S. As far back 
as Plato’s Republic, proceeding via Hobbes’s Leviathan, all sorts 
of individual freedoms have been deemed abridgeable in the 
name of achieving “social peace.” 
Waldron concedes that in difficult cases the law should 
generally stay “on the liberal side.”56 Yet with his core concepts 
of legitimacy so wholly indeterminate, he offers no obvious point 
at which claims for “social peace” end and those for “the liberal 
side” begin. What’s to stop Waldron’s concept of “social peace” 
reducing to straightforwardly majoritarian or sociological criteria 
just as readily as his concept of legitimacy? 
 
 55. Waldron, supra note 8, at 713. 
 56. WALDRON (2012), supra note 46, at 126. 
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Once again, Waldron appears to make a claim about 
legitimacy, but ends up altogether side-lining it as a distinct 
political value, this time summarily collapsing it into the 
consequentialist terms of the weary “freedom versus security” 
trade-off. Even on that point, Waldron is simply assuming a 
material causation—that such abridgment of freedom does 
indeed lead to greater social peace—for which he cites no 
evidence.57 He frequently praises various democracies for their 
bans, but for all of his consequentialist assumptions he never 
actually examines empirical evidence from any of them in any 
rigorous way. On the available record, “social peace” has declined 
over several decades in a number of democracies that maintain 
bans,58 some of them applauded by Waldron. 
And if Waldron did have such evidence? Social peace is an 
interest of all governments. Yes, a democracy needs it, but only in 
the sense that any constitutional form needs it. It is in no way an 
interest specifically constitutive of democracy. Jill Hasday 
altogether reasonably suggests that democracies may “need social 
peace more than authoritarian regimes because they depend more 
on the population’s cooperation, as opposed to fear.”59 Whether 
states rely on sticks or carrots, however, is a question about 
means, not ends. Authoritarian states indeed seek peace through 
intimidation, whilst democracies seek it through trust. In both 
cases, however, it is social peace they seek. Social peace is, in sum, 
a security interest shared by all states, and not an interest unique 
to democracies. Once again, then, we witness the question of 
democratic legitimacy not resolved but eschewed. Serving a 
security interest may well legitimate a state as a state but in no way 
legitimates it as a democracy. For the time being, then, Waldron 
remains at square one. Any specifically democratic concept 
legitimacy is inherently normative. If one wishes to defend bans 
on extreme expression per se, then one must adduce a specifically 
normative theory of legitimacy—and it must be a democratic one. 
Waldron and other defenders of speech bans have thus far failed 
at that task. 
 
 57. HEINZE (2016), supra note 2, at 124–29. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 145–53. 
 59. Private communication of 5 March 2017, on file with author. 
